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Abstract 
The rural American vote was central to Donald Trump’s presidential victory in 2016. In 
an attempt to unpack the strongest motivators for rural Americans who voted for Trump, 
analyses explored the importance of anti-immigrant and anti-elite sentiment using a subset of 
rural participants in the 2016 American National Elections Study. Through a combination of 
quantitative data work, qualitative case studies and an extensive literature review, it was found 
that both anti-immigrant and anti-elite sentiments are indicators of a vote for Trump. However, 
the research and analyses suggest anti-immigrant sentiment is a stronger indicator.  
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Introduction 
 As the United States entered the 2016 presidential election, there was a palpable 
uneasiness among the American people; an undertone of rebellion that was about to come to the 
surface. Prior to the 2016 election, “Americans were said to be angry, anxious [and] fearful. 
‘They were said to be poised for a major reset’” (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018, 12). On 
November 8, 2016, the final electoral votes came in with Donald Trump winning the presidency, 
to the surprise of many Americans. This outcome was fueled by narrow victories in the states of 
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan which ultimately proved to be the difference in electoral 
votes for the two primary candidates. Another state that received a lot of attention was 
Minnesota, a historically very blue state, with Democratic candidates tending to win by large 
margins, that almost went red for the first time in over three decades. Outside of the South, white 
rural places have always been rather Republican. However, the 2016 election saw these rural 
places going even further to the right (McKee, 2018). This was particularly true in the Upper 
Midwest states. 
Two of the biggest themes of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign were his stance on 
immigration and his appeal to the common, blue collar individual. Many political commentators 
concluded that Trump’s strong anti-immigrant and/or anti-elite sentiment motivated his strong 
showing in rural areas. Now, even in his third year in office, the Trump Administration continues 
to focus on the topic of immigration above most other issues. This, combined with consistently 
low approval ratings, creates a question as to whether or not Trump is actually following through 
with what the voters wanted. Perhaps the heart of his base, rural voters, were rather uninformed 
about who exactly they were voting for which would explain higher levels of dissatisfaction 
today. In their timely book, Identity Crisis, Sides, Tesler and Vavreck also note that, “views of 
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racial inequality, Muslims and immigration, as well as more politicized white identity, not only 
were strongly related to whether Americans voted for Clinton or Trump but were also more 
strongly related to how people voted in 2016 than in other recent presidential elections” (2018, 
156). My research question then asks, was the sentiment in rural America during the 2016 
presidential election more strongly about being anti-immigrant or anti-elite? I hypothesize that 
while both factors came into play, voting behavior in rural America was more strongly correlated 
with pushing back at the establishment of Washington and the political elite class than it was 
about opposing immigrants. 
 
Plan of the Paper  
I will begin with two case studies on the states of Wisconsin and Pennsylvania in order to 
demonstrate the shift that happened among rural voters in 2016. After that, I will outline the 
scholarly literature surrounding public views towards immigrants, elites in Washington as well 
as how these ideas specifically correlate with identity and perception among people who live in 
rural communities. Through these connections, it is clear that the literature varies in conclusions 
as to which factor, anti-immigrant or anti-elite, is more prominent in influencing voting behavior. 
Upon assessing the literature I will then present my own quantitative research as well as the 
results that I gathered. This was done through logistic regressions using 2016 American National 
Election Studies (ANES) data which allows for a pool of rural respondents and contains 
variables addressing both anti-immigrant and anti-elite sentiment. As presented in the discussion 
section, the results are interesting, showing anti-immigrant attitudes being a stronger indicator of 
a Trump vote, but they also leave a lot of room for further research, which is where this paper 
concludes. 
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A Closer Look at Two States 
 In order to create a foundation for this research, the 2016 elections in the states of 
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania will be discussed. While neither of the following examples address 
anti-immigrant or anti-elite sentiment, they do show how the rural vote was strongly for Trump 
in 2016, particularly in the Upper Midwest. This voting shift is central to understanding the 
relevance of the rest of the research. 
Donald Trump’s victory in the state of Wisconsin was the first time that the state’s 
electoral votes had been for a Republican presidential candidate since 1984, with Trump 
receiving 27,000 more votes than Clinton (Jones 2016). Interestingly, Trump received about the 
same number of votes as Romney did in 2012 when Obama won the state. However, the 
difference was that Clinton received 240,000 less votes than Obama did with third party 
candidates drawing a larger vote in 2016 (Jones 2016). In some areas of Wisconsin this can be 
attributed to the fact that voter turnout was higher in many rural places but down quite 
significantly in urban areas (Jones 2016). In looking at the break down by county of this vote, it 
can be seen that from 2012 to 2016, twenty two counties shifted from blue to red, eighteen of 
which were considered rural counties (Meyers 2016). This means that, statistically speaking, 
Trump won the rural vote by twenty seven points whereas Bush won by ten back in 2004, with 
Obama’s highest rural victory being by a margin of eight points. (Meyers 2016). Clearly, there 
has been a shift in what motivates this rural vote. 
 The state of Pennsylvania has a rather similar story, although the favorable outcome of 
Trump was even more decisive than it was in Wisconsin, with Trump winning 73,254 more 
votes than Clinton (Kraus 2016). Historically speaking, Democrats have done well in 
Pennsylvania as long as they tallied large vote margins in the majors cities of Pittsburgh and 
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Philadelphia, and then padded the vote a little in the some of the former industrial power house, 
big union counties (Kraus 2016). While Clinton dominated in the southeast corner of the state as 
well as the urban parts of the state, she failed to appeal to the rest of the state including the blue 
collar counties such as Luzerne and Wilkes-Barre (Kraus 2016). Another swing county, so to 
speak, is Buck County, which tends to swing blue, but went strongly red in 2016 (Panaritis, 
Purcell, Brennan and Couloumbis 2016). Back in the 1980’s Ronald Reagan was an incredibly 
popular politician and President who appealed to voters on both sides of the aisle. This meant 
that in his landslide presidential victories many Democratic voters crossed the aisle and cast a 
ballot for him instead of Carter in 1980 and Mondale in 1984. Many of these same Reagan 
Democrats in Pennsylvania went back to the GOP in 2016, and that made all the difference for 
this state.  
 
Literature Review 
 People have a complex set of motivations when making voting choices. This means that 
it is hard to break down voting behavior to have it be predominantly explained by one sole factor 
such as immigration or attitudes towards elites. For these reasons it makes sense that the 
literature is rather divided, and in many cases shows traces of negative attitudes towards both 
immigrants and elites as key factors in understanding rural voting. For the purpose of this 
discussion and comparison, immigration attitudes will be talked about first, then elite attitudes, 
closing with how both of these factors impact a person’s identity, particularly among rural 
citizens. 
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Immigration 
When looking at immigration attitudes, it’s important to first start by understanding the 
crucial roles that the media, as well as the rhetoric used by the President at the time, play in 
impacting the lens through which the public understands immigration in the United States. 
Arthur and Woods point out in their article about the “Contextual Presidency” that the “most 
important problem” the president faces is the economy, which tends to also be the factor that is 
most directly tied to how Americans view immigrants (2013). This link between economics and 
immigration means when the economy is doing poorly, Presidents have a tendency to talk about 
immigration in more negative terms in order to distract people and keep their approval ratings 
up. Additionally, this means that social as well as economic context are highly influential in how 
immigration is discussed. Jones-Correa and Graauw also argue that history is impactful, often 
times without people noticing. One must understand past laws, reforms, treatment and attitudes 
of immigration in order to fully grasp where we are at today (2013). When there is a lack of 
background knowledge, ideas and terms are not able to be fully understood in a more modern 
context. This means that when things, such as birthright citizen or building a wall on the southern 
border are discussed, people are unable to comprehend the implications of such actions or why 
certain aspects of the immigration system are necessary, or for that matter, unnecessary. History 
is also important in that presidents are forced to act within the set of laws and rules as established 
by their predecessors (Arthur 2013).  
 Such discussions and attitudes surrounding immigration lead to a wide variety of 
conclusions and opinions by scholars as to what a general feeling is among Americans. There are 
also many stances as to what information Americans deem the most influential in determining 
immigration opinions. For example, there is a lot of negative rhetoric surrounding crime that ties 
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it to immigration (Zats and Smith 2012). This, in large part, stems from media portrayal which 
places an emphasis on non-whites committing crimes. Wuthnow deepens this argument in his 
book The Left Behind, and found that some “people feel frustrated, helpless and angry [...] and so 
undocumented workers get blamed for everything--crimes, drugs, no matter what, it’s the 
immigrants” (Wuthnow 2018, 146).  In her work, Fussell found that despite what the media may 
say, American attitudes towards immigration are actually improving, and they are becoming 
more open to diversity (Fussell 2014). Interestingly enough, Wuthnow also interviewed some 
people who said, “In the past five years we’ve seen that [Hispanic immigrants] are here, they’re 
staying, they’re part of the community. We’ve gotten used to each other” (Wuthnow 2018, 148). 
This suggests that the length of stay impacts the attitudes of the non-immigrants.  
Overall, “issues like immigration, racial discrimination, and the integration of Muslims 
boil down to competing visions of American identity and inclusiveness” (Sides, Tesler, Vavreck 
2018, 10). Going further than conclusions based on media portrayal or longevity of stay, Hero 
makes the argument that negative attitudes aren’t just about the topic or label of “immigrant,” but 
rather are more about ideas and perceptions that are held about race and ethnicity (2010). These 
types of beliefs or feelings about race and ethnicity are usually tied to the concept of identity. 
Garcia and Davidson make a similar argument that immigration is seen as a threat to American 
beliefs about cost of living, political ideology, labor market competition and demographic 
characteristics (2013). Gimpel and Ley agree with this immigrant threatened feeling for adults in 
particular. In rural America specifically, adults feel as though immigrants are taking from the 
already narrow income distribution and changing the cultural norms which are important to small 
towns (Gimpel and Ley 2008).   
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Gimpel and Ley get more specific with the idea of feeling threatened by breaking it down 
by age; young people, they say, have more positive views towards immigrants because of their 
high levels of interaction (2008). In her article, “Spaces of Encounters: Immigration, Race, Class 
and the Politics of Belonging in Small-Town America,” Leitner helps us understand this idea of 
‘disruption of cultural norms’ through the term “spaces of encounters.” This term captures the 
idea that rural communities have historically been, and are still largely, made up of long-term 
white residents who are now being faced with growing diversity (2012). Whiteness, she says, has 
a “historical and geographical contingency” which creates a “racialized production of space” 
(Leitner 2012, 831). In recent years, as diversity has been growing in rural areas, white residents 
may perceive this change as a threat to their identities as predominantly white, European 
communities.  
This growing diversity in rural areas is largely due to the growth of the meat and poultry 
processing industries as well as availability of entry level jobs farming and working construction 
(Wuthnow 2018). Immigrants are willing to work manual labor-intensive jobs as well as jobs 
that, in general, pay less. Based on her research in rural Arkansas, Hallet found that immigrants 
were accepted into the community as long as they worked lower-wage jobs only and presented 
themselves as hard working, which is a key American value (2012). This phemonoma leads to 
the creation of in-groups and out-groups as immigrants are made to feel as though they must 
meet certain stereotypical criteria in order to be deemed as accepted. In this way, fully 
integrating into the community does not seem to be a feasible option for many immigrants. 
Garcia and Davidson push back against Leitner and Hallet in that they acknowledge there is 
plenty of documented homogeneity in rural America, but changes in economic restructuring, 
population loss, improved transportation and communication in recent years have made rural 
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Americans’ voting behavior less distinct from more urban areas (Garcia and Davidson 2013). 
This means that a distinct American identity does not have a relationship to immigration attitudes 
(Garcia and Davidson 2013). Hero looks at this idea of the impact of movement as well, saying 
that indeed concentration or dispersion affect perception and identity. This, then, influences how 
outgroups feel about themselves and how ingroups address diversity in their communities 
(2010). 
Elite Resentment  
As mentioned above, identity, some believe, is influenced by social class standing and 
economic indicators such as income. Gest makes the argument that Trump represents the 
American dream, and what many lower income, rural, people aspire to (2016). In addition, Gest 
states that Americans are less inclined to resent the rich because they’re “job creators,” 
“innovators,” and “engineers of economic growth” (2016). This makes Trump more like “one of 
them” (Gest 2016). Interestingly enough, “on average, Trump did a bit better among those with 
lower incomes than those with higher incomes” which could support these notions (Sides, Tesler, 
Vavreck 2018, 74). Ball adds to Gest’s argument by saying that although blue-collar workers are 
very different from Trump, they view him as believable and different from the norm of 
Washington DC (2018). Trump is shaking things up, as well as pushing back at established 
politicians. It can be said that factors such as these contributed to why rural people, who 
previously felt like they did not have a voice, voted for him. Rural Americans casted ballots that 
they felt was going against the elite of Washington. Wuthnow also echos the scholarly 
assessment that government is not listening to how rural Americans are feeling (Wuthnow 2018). 
This evidence suggests that a more anti-elite or anti-establishment vote could very well be what 
we saw in rural America in 2016. 
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An anti-elite motivation can also be created from rural individuals with less education 
who in turn have disdain for those with higher education degrees. Through her field work, 
Cramer found that many rural Wisconsin residents could not understand why someone would 
spend the money on a bachelors, masters or doctoral degree when technical school training takes 
less time, is less expensive and lends itself to high paying jobs (2016, 119). These ideas about 
education are also tied to social class as often times it is middle and higher class people who 
have the funds to attend universities. People in rural areas tend to be in a lower social class 
which would in turn explain a belief in a vocational school following high school.  
Not only is the importance of education level something that is persistently debated, an 
individual's education level also tends to be an indicator of partisanship and voting behavior. As 
Sides, Tesler and Vavreck found, “Trump’s strength among white voters without college degrees 
[...] helped explain why a relatively small but important fraction of Obama voters ended up 
voting for him” (2018,155-156). In 2016 it was found that level of education was particularly 
important for white voters. In fact, those with a high school degree or less were 24 percentage 
points more Republican than Democratic and those with some college education or a technical 
school degree were 19 percentage points more Republican than Democrat (Sides, Tesler and 
Vavreck 2018, 26). The correlation between education level and Party ID in 2016 shows an 
attitude that pushes back against higher education which is associated with many politicians and 
the upper, elite class of society. 
Rural Identity  
Despite conflicting views of how immigration and elite sentiment impacts identity, there 
seems to be a general consensus of the role identity plays in influencing how rural people in 
particular vote. Katherine Cramer, in her well known book The Politics of Resentment coins two 
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important terms to unpacking rural identity, “rural consciousness” and a “politics of resentment.” 
Rural consciousness is “an identity as a rural person that includes much more than an attachment 
to place. It includes a sense that decision makers routinely ignore rural places and fail to give 
rural communities their fair share of resources, as well as a sense that rural folks are 
fundamentally different from urbanites in terms of lifestyles, values and work ethic” (2016, 5-6). 
A politics of resentment is “the way social identities, the emotion of resentment and economic 
insecurity interact” (2016, 9). In 2016 this political identity became particularly important as 
feelings, which translated into votes tended to center around “which groups [individuals] 
identified with and how they felt about other groups” (Sides, Tesler, Vavreck 2018, 2). To 
clarify, these groups “were defined by the characteristics that have long divided Americans: race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, nationality, and, ultimately, partisanship” (Sides, Tesler, Vavreck 
2018, 2).  
Given how Cramer’s research was done prior to 2016, and the fact that immigration was 
a topic left out, there is room to expand upon her work while still using her findings and 
terminology as a basis of understanding. However, Fussell would agree with this Cramer’s 
approach in leaving this topic out as she believes that theories surrounding immigration as a 
threat to one’s identity are becoming obsolete (2014). Ball takes on identity much in the same 
lane as Cramer, when he talks about Pennsylvania blue-collar steel workers who feel as though 
Trump is believable and appreciate the fact that he understands their concerns as white men 
(2018). No matter what argument is made for most important influences on identity, Cramer 
reminds us all that “identities are perceptions, [and are] not necessarily consistent with objective 
circumstances”  (2016, 15).  
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In order to better understand what is going on with negative attitudes or feelings in rural 
America, conversations have to start happening and interactions between more diverse groups 
need to become the norm. While Garcia and Davidson believe that rural areas are just as well 
connected as urban places thanks to technology, Gimpel and Ley still believe there is a lack of 
exposure to more diverse experiences in rural areas. With more interaction between longtime 
residents of rural towns and immigrants who are new to the country, negative stereotypes and 
attitudes can be broken down (Gimpel and Ley 2008). The fact that many of these authors such 
as Wuthnow, Cramer and Hallet, to name a few, sat down face to face with rural Americans also 
shows the importance of these types of interactions to make meaningful connections and grow 
deeper understandings.  
 
Research Design/Methodology 
 To quantitatively test my hypothesis, 2016 ANES data was used to create a basis of 
comparison about voting motivations across rural parts of the country as a whole. With the 
independent variables being anti-immigrant and anti-elite attitudes, the dependent variable is 
voting support for Trump. Another key factor to note is that the focus here is on rural America 
and not the country as a whole. This demographic was chosen for two primary reasons. The first 
is that the rural vote was particularly important to Trump’s eventual victory in the Upper 
Midwest states. Secondly, there is a growing urban-rural divide, which has lead to what scholars, 
such as Cramer, are calling rural resentment, stemming from a politics of resentment. 
Understanding what is at the core of this divide is crucial to understanding the core future of 
GOP support. 
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Model 1 serves as the primary source of my quantitative analysis. In order to create an 
anti-immigrant variable for this model, three pre-election questions from ANES are combined 
that best captured immigration attitudes. These questions are (1) favor or oppose birthright 
citizenship (2) strength of agreement in building a with Mexico and (3) how important it is to 
speak English in the U.S.. For questions one and two, a response of one is in favor, two is oppose 
and a three is neither in favor or oppose. For the third question respondents are given a feeling 
thermometer ranging from one, very important, to four, not at all important. Given the different 
scales used, response scores were averaged after confirming the items were highly correlated. In 
the scale created, a lower numerical score is equivalent to a stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. 
There are not many questions that had clear ties to anti-elite sentiment, so my variable for this 
attitude is comprised of just one question; “how often does the respondent trust the government 
in Washington to do what is right?”1 Participants are then given a feeling thermometer to score 
their response on with a one being always and a five being never. This measurement means that a 
lower numerical response lends itself to a lower anti-elite attitude. These scales are then tested as 
predictors of whether the respondents voted for either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in order 
to look at the impact of strong attitudes in these areas in relation to which candidate respondents 
voted for.  
Additionally, these data scales are crossed with rural identifying variables. Congressional 
districts identified as either pure rural, rural-suburban mix or sparse suburban by GitHub are 
selected as the a qualification for respondents to be included in the above analysis. After 
selecting responses that only came from rural-like congressional districts and only responses who 
indicated either voting for Trump or Clinton, there were 1,090 responses that were able to be 
                                                
1 One can ask whether anti-Washington is the same thing as anti-elite. In the pre-election ANES this 
question was best seen to capture this concept. 
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used for analysis. As an essential control variable, a seven point political party ID scale was used 
in order to ensure that party and anti-immigrant attitudes or party and anti-elite attitudes do not 
mean the same thing.  
Model 2 aims to address the same anti-elite and anti-immigrant sentiments as Model 1, 
but uses post-election ANES question instead of pre-election questions. Given the fact that the 
questions are different and were asked at a different time, it is a useful comparison to Model 1 in 
order to see the impact of time (pre vs post) on attitude, specifically when looking at anti-elite 
bias. Specifics for this model will be addressed later on. 
 
Results 
I ran two seperate bivariate, logistic regressions using the 2016 ANES polling data. The 
first model includes questions that were asked prior to the election (pre) and the second model 
uses questions that were asked after (post). The models and explanations are as follows. 
Table 1: Model 1 Summary 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 597.492a .551 .742 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
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Table 1 explains the overall strength of the model which is in Table 3. The Cox & Snell 
R number suggests that Model 1 explains about half of the variance in whether a respondent said 
they voted for Trump or for Clinton.  
 
Table 2: Cases Classified by Model 1 
Classification Tablea 
  
Observed 
Predicted 
  
Who did R Vote for (2 
cat) 
Percentage 
Correct 
  
Clinton Trump 
Step 1 Who did R Vote 
for (2 cat) 
Clinton 381 66 85.2 
Trump 56 568 91.0 
Overall Percentage     88.6 
a. The cut value is .500,  NOTE: Correct classification assuming all Trump = 58.2 
 The data pool was modified so that only respondents who voted for one of the two 
primary candidates, Clinton or Trump, were included in the final regression. Table 2 shows just 
how strong the model is at predicting how a respondent voted based on their responses to the 
questions selected for the three independent variables, anti-immigrant, anti-elite and party ID. In 
fact, the prediction accuracy is 88.6 percent. Without these independent variables, the accuracy is 
58.2 percent.  
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Model 1 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
AntiMigrantPre -1.431 .117 149.025 1 .000 .239 
PRE: REV How 
often trust govt in 
Wash to do what is 
right 
.419 .130 10.367 1 .001 1.521 
Party ID 3 Cat 2.242 .167 180.205 1 .000 9.414 
Constant -.824 .683 1.454 1 .228 .439 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: AntiMigrantPre, PRE: REV How often trust govt in Wash to do what is 
right, Party ID 3 Cat. 
 
From this table it can be concluded that all three variables, anti-immigrant, anti-elite and 
party have a significant relationship with which candidate the respondent voted for. This is 
because of what direction the coefficients (B values) are showing. A coefficient moving in a 
positive direction shows a prediction of a vote for Trump and a coefficient moving in a negative 
direction is a prediction of a vote for Clinton. From Table 3, party ID has the strongest 
correlation with a vote for Trump. The anti-immigrant variable has the second strongest 
correlation and is more significant than anti-elite (p<.001). Despite the results not fully 
supporting my hypothesis, the data still makes sense given the direction the B values are moving. 
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Model 2 
Model 2 uses post-election questions as the 2016 ANES data seems to have items that 
create anti-elite and anti-immigrant variables. To measure anti-immigrant sentiment, the 
questions that were most strongly correlated were whether American culture is generally harmed 
by immigrants, if immigrants increase the crime rate, as well as three questions about if being 
truly American means to have been born in the U.S., to have American ancestry and to speak 
English. Respondents were asked to give a response on a scale of one to five for each question 
with one being agree strongly and five being disagree strongly. This scale means that a lower 
score shows a stronger anti-immigrant attitude. For anti-elite attitudes, the questions that were 
most strongly correlated were whether or not most politicians care, are politicians the main 
problem in government and whether or not most politicians only care about the rich and 
powerful. Again, participants were asked to respond on a scale from one to five with one being 
agree strongly and five being disagree strongly. This scale means that a higher score shows a 
stronger anti-elite attitude. 
Table 4: Model 2 Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 712.602a .499 .672 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
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Table 4 of Model 2 explains the strength of the overall model which is depicted in Table 6. The 
Cox & Snell R Square show that Model 2 explains just under half of the variance in whether or 
not a respondent said they voted for Trump or Clinton.  
Table 5: Cases Classified by Model 2 
  
Observed 
Predicted 
  Who did R Vote for (2 
cat) 
Percentage 
Correct 
  
Clinton Trump 
 
Step 1 Who did R Vote 
for (2 cat) 
Clinton 364 82 81.6 
Trump 74 548 88.1 
Overall Percentage     85.4 
a. The cut value is .500.  NOTE: Correct classification assuming all Trump = 58.2 
After incorporating the post-election independent variables, the overall prediction 
percentage goes up to 85.4 percent. Although this is slightly less than using the pre-election 
independent variables in Model 1, it is still shows a strong predictive capability. 
Table 6: Logistic Regression Model 2 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Anti Elite Scale 3 
item (lower=anti) 
-.039 .110 .125 1 .724 .962 
Anti Immigrant 
Scale (lower=anti) 
-1.389 .138 101.562 1 .000 .249 
Party ID 3 Cat 2.622 .161 265.081 1 .000 13.769 
Constant -.984 .455 4.685 1 .030 .374 
a. Variable(s): Anti Elite Scale 3 item (lower=anti), Anti Immigrant Scale (lower=anti), Party ID 3 Cat. 
18
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 The negative coefficients for the anti-elite and anti-immigrant variables is surprising 
given the results of the pre-election data in Model 1. These results for the anti-elite variable in 
particular are likely impacted by the fact that Trump had already been elected to the presidency 
at the time these questions were asked. This means that the anti-elite variable created using the 
post-election questions did not create a variable that accurately accounts for anti-elite sentiment. 
This idea will be further expanded upon in the discussion. Not surprisingly, the strongest variable 
remains the Party ID variable. The fact that this is true of both Model 1 and Model 2 makes it an 
important comparison among the other two variables; anti-elite and anti-immigrant sentiment. 
 
Discussion 
 My hypothesis is in large part based off of Katherine Cramer’s book as her work broke 
the ground for political science research on rural America. Cramer’s findings are centered around 
resentment towards urban areas. This includes those in power and positions of authority, such as 
government officials, who are centered in those big city spaces. In trying to expand her findings 
from Wisconsin, it makes sense to assume that anti-elite sentiment would be a stronger indicator 
of a Trump vote. That is why this research predicted that anti-elite sentiment would be a stronger 
indicator of a vote for Trump. However, Cramer did not ask any questions about race or 
immigration in her work, so perhaps these negative sentiments about such topics were present, 
and even strong, they just didn’t happen to come up in conversation.  
The results of this research show that anti-immigrant sentiment was more prominent in 
rural voters who supported Trump. However, I don’t entirely believe that the quantitative results 
of my research can be generalized across the country or taken as entirely accurate as there are 
some internal validity issues. The questions selected in order to create the variables do not 
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necessarily address the the desired sentiments as well as they could due to subjectivity in 
question selection as well as limitations in the question pool based on what was asked by ANES. 
This is particularly true within the anti-elite variable as there is a difference between political 
elite resentment based on partisanship and negative attitudes towards the elite social class as a 
whole. In addition, the responses are not necessarily equally dispersed across all rural parts of the 
country. In fact, some congressional districts were heavily represented and others not at all. This 
means that further data work from different sources is necessary in order to confirm the accuracy 
of my findings. When looking at Model 2 specifically, the post election results are somewhat 
problematic as responses were given following the election which skews how people respond. 
For example, if they voted for Trump, who was ultimately elected, respondents are more likely 
not to have as strong of an anti-elite feeling towards government because, in their mind, the 
favorable candidate, who to them is anti-elite, is the one who was elected. 
 Despite the potential internal validity discrepancies of my quantitative work, my research 
is still valuable because it is an original measure within rural America as well as expansion of 
Cramer’s ideas. Sides, Tesler and Vavreck looked at similar sentiments in their work, however 
their measure was of the country as a whole, all types of counties included, and one of their 
variables was more centered around race rather than immigration. While rural is gaining 
momentum in political science conversations, there is still little discussion about implications on 
a national scale or in relation to specific events such as national elections which in this case is the 
2016 presidential election. Using the variables conceptualized in this research is also a new 
approach to thinking about the rural vote. This is an important lens to apply not only because it is 
specific to the 2016 election, but also because it addresses voting motivation rather than political 
attitudes or feelings of identity more generally. 
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Conclusions 
Through quantitative measures this research aimed to look at whether an anti-immigrant 
or an anti-elite sentiment was a stronger indicator of a rural vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 
presidential election. The results showed that anti-immigrant bias was a stronger indicator of a 
vote for Trump, but that naturally Party ID was overwhelmingly the strongest indicator for rural 
votes. A point of uncertainty is that there is much debate among scholars about rural attitudes 
and rural voting behavior. There is no doubt that voters are very complex, with many factors 
influencing their choices. While the literature is clear about the importance Party ID plays in 
predicting voting outcomes, other indicators or heavy influences on rural votes are unclear at this 
time. This is still an incredibly timely subject. Having a better understanding of voting behavior 
starts with conversations and comparisons such as the one being proposed. It is important to 
understand voters not only from a political strategy standpoint, but also because politics should 
really be about the constituents. That is how the U.S. can remain a democracy run by the people 
and for the people. We live in a political climate that is out of tune with the people, so that is 
where the focus of study and understanding needs to shift back to: the people. 
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